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ARTICLES
THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
MIDSTREAM: MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS
Donald J. Weidner*
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1914, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("the Conference") approved the
Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), which was ultimately enacted
in every state except Louisiana. The UPA, which applies both
to general partnerships and to limited partnerships, has been
the object of surprisingly few state variations and remained
unchanged by the Conference for over seventy-five years.
Nevertheless, a number of developments have caused the
Conference to reconsider what may be its most venerable act.
The years since the adoption of the UPA have seen the
introduction and development of entire systems of law that bear
heavily on partnerships and limited partnerships. Consider, for
example, the impact on partnerships of the federal income tax,
the federal securities laws and the nationwide adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, bodies of law that
existed when the UPA was first crafted, such as the federal
Bankruptcy Code, have undergone significant change. Until
now, the UPA was not amended either to make course corrections
in policy or to harmonize in any other way with these
developments. Yet the mere passage of time meant that the very
language of the law was itself changing.
© Donald J. Weidner 1990
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; B.S., 1966,
Fordham University; J.D., 1969, University of Texas at Austin. Professor
Weidner wishes to thank Michael Ansaldi and Robert W. Hillman for reviewing
a draft of this speech, which was presented at The University of Toledo
College of Law Fifth Annual Colloquium on Corporate Law and Social
Policy. Professor Weidner is the Reporter for the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act. The views expressed are his own, however, and do not necessarily
represent the views of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws or its Drafting Committee.
TOLEDO LA W REVIEW
In addition to the more global changes, fundamental changes
were taking place in the very backyard of partnership law-the
law of limited partnerships. The backyard, indeed, had become
a shopping center-for venture capital. Aided by favorable tax
classification rules and depreciation policy, limited partnerships
were reborn in the 1970's. The Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("ULPA"), which the Conference first adopted in 1916,
was a statutory, covered wagon in a world of cars sporting
compact disc players and cellular phones. The ULPA was revised
first in 1976 and again in 1985. As ULPA became Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA") and the law of
the limited partnership was brought into the late twentieth
century, it was only a matter of time that UPA would become
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). In 1984, Georgia
enacted a major revision of its partnership act.' In January of
1986, an American Bar Association Committee issued a detailed
report that recommended extensive changes to the UPA, many
of them along the lines of the recent Georgia changes. 2 In the
fall of 1986, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986
("the 1986 Act"). The 1986 Act changed the comparative tax
advantages of partnerships and corporations by setting corporate
income tax rates higher than individual income tax rates while
tightening up on the corporate income tax.
In the fall of 1987, the Conference appointed a Drafting
Committee to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act. The Drafting
Committee held its initial meeting in January of 1988, and has
been meeting periodically ever since. In August of 1989, a first
draft of RUPA was presented to the Conference at its annual
plenary session. The presentation that was begun last summer
will continue this summer, and it is expected that RUPA will
be finalized and approved by the Conference in the summer of
1991. My presentation today treats five fundamental areas of
policy concern in the revision process, with emphasis on two
that have proven particularly difficult: breakups and fiduciary
duties.
1. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-8-1 to -43 (Supp. 1987).
2. UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and
Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act
Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAW. 121 (1987) (hereinafter ABA Report].
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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II. THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND DEFAULT VERSUS
MANDATORY RULES
The UPA has a wide range of provisions that govern the
rights and obligations the partners have among themselves. It is
not completely clear which of these rules are default rules and
which are mandatory rules. A default rule is one that applies
only in the absence of a provable partnership agreement to the
contrary. A mandatory rule, on the other hand, is one that
applies even in the face of a partnership agreement to the
contrary.
Some, but not all, of the UPA rules governing the relations
among partners state that they are "subject to" a contrary
agreement. UPA section 18, for example, is the basic section
that defines the rights and liabilities the partners have among
themselves. The introductory language of UPA section 18
provides that its rules are "subject to any agreement between"
the partners, thus making it inescapable that the rules of UPA
section 18 are default rules rather than mandatory rules. There
are, however, other provisions governing the relations among
the partners that do not expressly state they are subject to
contrary agreement. Does expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the maxim of statutory construction, require or at least suggest
that the remaining rules in the UPA are mandatory because
they do not contain the same or similar qualifying language?
Consider, for example, UPA section 20, which provides without
qualification that partners "shall render on demand true and
full information of all things affecting the partnership to any
partner." Is an attempt to contract away this rule enforceable?
For further example, is only part of UPA section 19 subject to
contrary agreement? UPA section 19 provides that partnership
books and records shall be kept, "subject to any agreement
between the partners," at the principal place of business of the
partnership. It then provides, without express qualification, that
"every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect
and copy any" partnership books. If the partnership agreement
limits or eliminates completely a partner's access to the
partnership books, is it enforceable? Finally, consider the rule
of UPA section 21 that partners must account for any profit
they derive "without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the . . . conduct . . . of the
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partnership." Is a partnership agreement that waives all rights
to bring a claim under UPA section 21 enforceable?
Questions about whether these rules are default rules or
mandatory rules do not arise simply because textual analysis
raises the inevitable comparisons. They arise because different
policy conclusions could be reached by different people. A
libertarian, free-market oriented policy maker is likely to suggest
that all the rules governing the relations among the partners
should be merely default rules-that partners ought to be held
to whatever bargain they negotiate. A more parentalistic policy
maker, on the other hand, would be more inclined to support
mandatory fiduciary duties to protect minority partners. For
example, a parentalist might resist the conclusion that a minority
partner should be permitted to contract away his access to
partnership books and records.
The Drafting Committee wanted to make clear that all but a
very few of the rules governing the relations among partners
are merely default rules. It was only in rare situations that the
Committee felt that the rules should be mandatory. Mandatory
rules governing the relations among partners are essentially
parentalistic, and the Committee felt that, with only very limited
exception, adults in nonconsumer transactions are old enough
and wise enough to be held to their agreements. The results of
the Committee deliberations are reflected in RUPA's new section
4X.
RUPA section 4X(a) contains the general rule that RUPA
governs the relations among the partners unless there is a
partnership agreement to the contrary. It thus states, although
somewhat indirectly, the basic principle that the agreement of
the parties is supreme. The statement of general principle avoids
the need for repetitive parenthetical statements within individual
rules that they are "subject to" contrary agreement. This statutory
structure also avoids the interpretative problems that would arise
in the most unlikely event the Reporter falls asleep at the quill
and neglects to place properly a parenthetical. Given the basic
libertarian policy perspective of the Drafting Committee, it is
easier to note the limited expressions of parentalism than the
much more numerous expressions of the supremacy of the
partnership contract.
RUPA section 4X lists the handful of mandatory rules that
govern the relations among partners. First, the partners' general
duty of good faith and fair dealing under RUPA section 21(a)
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may not be varied. Second, the agreement may not vary the
requirement to wind up the partnership business upon certain
events. Third, the agreement may not vary the partners' right
to expel a member in certain situations. Finally, the agreement
may not vary the power of any partner to withdraw from the
partnership at any time.
A more extreme libertarian 'would argue that our list is too
long. Indeed, we were urged to abandon our traditional rule
that every partner has the power to withdraw at any time. On
the other hand, one who prefers a more parentalistic system
would prefer a longer list. The longer list might, for example,
give every partner a right to access to partnership books that
cannot be varied by agreement. I would like to return to
parentalism versus libertarianism and mandatory versus default
rules in the context of RUPA section 21, the core provision on
the fiduciary duties among partners.
III. THE MOVE TO THE ENTITY THEORY
RUPA contains a number of changes that move the law of
partnership closer to an entity theory. In general, both for state
law and tax law purposes, an entity model tends toward simplicity.
The move closer to an entity theory also reflects the Drafting
Committee perception that business people tend to perceive
partnerships as business entities and not merely as aggregations
of individuals.
The changes more fully incorporating an entity model are
numerous. At common law, in the absence of an enabling
statute, a partnership, not being a legal entity, could not sue or
be sued in the firm name. RUPA section 5(a) provides that a
partnership "may sue and be sued in the partnership name."
This eliminates the problem that exists in certain jurisdictions
in which a partnership may sue or be sued only if every partner
is named in the action. RUPA section 5(b) provides, on the
other hand, that a partner "is not personally liable for any
judgment against the partnership unless he [or she] has been
served or has appeared in the action." RUPA section 8(e)
advances the entity theory by adding to the present rule that
property may be acquired in the partnership name the further
rule that title "so acquired vests as partnership property in the
partnership itself rather than in the partners individually." RUPA
section 13 advances the entity theory by an amendment adding
Summer 19901
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partners to the list of those who may sue the partnership on a
tort or other theory. This expands the remedies of a partner far
beyond the traditional remedies of actions for a dissolution or
an accounting. RUPA section 15 is amended to provide that
partners are jointly and severally liable for all partnership
obligations, which does not sound like a move to an entity
theory. It continues, however, by providing that creditors must
first seek satisfaction out of partnership assets. The liability of
partners is liability for the deficiency that cannot be collected
from the entity. Partners are thus more like guarantors of the
obligations of an entity than principal debtors. 4
The shift closer to an entity model can perhaps best be
illustrated by examining RUPA's discard of UPA's tenancy in
partnership. UPA section 24 states that every partner has "rights
in specific partnership property." UPA section 25(1) elaborates
by stating that each partner "is co-owner with his partners of
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership."
These statements reflect an aggregate conception that each partner
is a direct owner of an undivided interest in the partnership
business, including its assets. On the other hand, the remaining
subsections of UPA section 25 strip the individual partners of
all the incidents of ownership of partnership assets. By a process
of elimination, the incidents of ownership that are taken from
the partners are left in the partnership. Stated simply, the UPA's
provisions reach an entity result but insist on stating that result
in aggregate terms.
RUPA reaches an entity result and states it in entity terms.
RUPA section 25(a) states directly that property "transferred to
or otherwise acquired by a partnership becomes property of the
partnership rather than of the partners individually." RUPA
also eliminates all reference to a partner's rights in specific
partnership property. RUPA section 18X reaffirms that partners
are cut off from particular partnership assets, even ones they
contributed, by providing that no partner has a right to receive
a distribution in kind. Similarly, no partner can be forced to
take a disproportionate distribution in kind. RUPA section 26
provides that a partner's "assignable interest in the partnership
4. ABA Report, supra note 2, at 143 states that "this result would be
most consistent with general business expectations today."
830 [Vol. 21
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is the partner's share of the distributions. The interest is personal
property."
RUPA's new rules on partnership breakups also reflect a
significant move closer to an entity model. These rules are
discussed more fully below but are noted briefly here to complete
the picture of a broad move to an "entity" model. In short,
under RUPA, partnerships are no longer dissolved every time a
partner leaves. Although some withdrawals will trigger a winding
up of the business of the partnership, others will not. In many
situations, the partnership will continue uninterrupted by the
departure. RUPA section 41(a) provides that, unless otherwise
agreed, the relationships between a partnership and its creditors
are unaffected by the cessation of a partner's status or by the
addition of a new partner. Because under RUPA the "old"
partnership continues, it is no longer necessary to deem the
creation of a "new" partnership that must in turn be deemed
to assume the obligations of the "old" partnership. Under
RUPA, the "old" partnership simply continues with its rights
and obligations intact.
It was only after making these and other changes closer to
an entity model that the Drafting Committee finally moved to
amend RUPA to define partnerships as entities. As a result of
the most recent meeting of the Drafting Committee, RUPA
defines a partnership as "an entity resulting from the association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." RUPA does not, however, declare that the aggregate
theory is never appropriate. Nor does RUPA suggest the relentless
application of any general theory of the partnership form.
It is therefore to be expected that an aggregate approach will
continue to be applied in certain situations. The aggregate
approach often seems suited to the small partnership, including
the inadvertent partnership. Small partnerships seem more
personal, and so does the aggregate theory. Indeed, parties often
document small partnerships in aggregate terms. Larger
partnerships seem less personal, and hence more likely candidates
for the application of the entity theory. The larger the partnership,
moreover, the greater the harvest from the simplicity of the
entity model. With respect to both large and small partnerships,
however, the aggregate model is particularly useful to state the
traditional fiduciary duties among partners. For example, despite
RUPA's major move toward an entity theory, RUPA section
21(a) states that partners have a duty of good faith and fair
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dealing "towards the partnership and the other partners." Not
only must partners be concerned about the effect of their
conduct on the partnership business as an entity, but also they
must avoid oppressive behavior toward individual partners.
It is also expected that courts will not needlessly apply either
theory. The resort to the general theory of the business
organization is all too often a substitute for analysis, and we
do not urge a return to a jurisprudence of conceptions. There
are many cases in which the general theory of the business
organization should be of no concern. Unfortunately, shorthand
statements of theory are often treated as talismanic. Consider,
for example, the recent case of Mississippi Valley Title Insurance
Co. v. Malkove,5 which immediately became my favorite
illustration of this point. Two individuals received a conveyance
of a parcel of land and obtained a title insurance policy. Within
the year, they formed a partnership with two other individuals
and contributed the parcel. A restrictive covenant encumbering
the parcel was discovered, and suit was brought against the title
insurance company. The suit is good, said the majority, applying
the logic of the aggregate theory. The two individuals remained
co-owners of the property even after they contributed it to the
partnership, said the court, relying on the UPA's declaration of
a tenancy in partnership. Not so, said the dissent, because the
thrust of the tenancy in partnership provisions, especially when
put in the context of other UPA provisions, is that an entity
theory must be applied. And, concluded the dissent, under the
entity theory the partnership, not the two individuals, owns the
property. The partners may have some interest in the property,
but "these mere derivative rights are simply inadequate to
support a finding" against the title insurance company. 6
Mississippi Valley need not have been decided on the basis of
the general theory of the business organization. I enthusiastically
support RUPA's move closer to an entity theory, but do not
believe the theory should shortcircuit policy analysis. There is
no reason why the logic of the entity theory should be any more
ineluctably applied in the partnership area than in the corporate
area, and the entity theory of corporations is often set aside to
reach the right result. In Sandier v. New Jersey Realty Title
5. 540 So. 2d 674 (Ala. 1988).
6. Id. at 682.
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Insurance Co., 7 for example, the fee owner purchased a title
insurance policy and subsequently conveyed the fee to his wholly-
owned corporation. The court said that "any change short of
a complete transfer of his entire interest" would not defeat the
title insurance policy. It held that it was sufficient to retain an
insurable interest and that such an interest is retained by a
person who contributes property to his wholly-owned corporation.
In short, Sandier was decided on the basis of the right result
under the insurance policy, and not by blind application of the
general entity theory of the organization. I assume that similar
decisions can be reached under RUPA.
IV. STATEMENT OF PARTNERSHIP AUTHORITY
The Drafting Committee rejected the idea of a mandatory
statement of partnership. It was felt that there is no need to
add paperwork or disclosure requirements to the law of
partnership simply because paperwork and disclosure may be
required to form corporations and limited partnerships. For one
thing, our focus throughout RUPA has been on informal
partnerships that are formed, operated and liquidated with little
or no written agreement. For another, RUPA also applies to
inadvertent partnerships. It was unclear how we can ask a group
of people who do not think they are partners to register as
partners. Nor was it clear what the sanction should be for
noncompliance.
RUPA section 10X provides for voluntary recordation at the
state level of a statement of partnership authority. The most
important goal of the statement of authority is to facilitate real
property transfers. RUPA section IOX(a)(4) provides that the
statement must "specify the partners required to sign a transfer
of real property held in the name of the partnership." The new
provision is also intended to give effect to statements of authority
far beyond real property transfers. RUPA section 1OX(a)(5)
provides that the statement may "contain any other matters the
partnership chooses, including the authority, or restrictions upon
the authority, of some or all of the partners to enter into other
transactions on behalf of the partnership."
7. 36 N.J. 471, 178 A.2d 1 (1962).
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The recording of an extraordinary grant of authority is treated
differently than a recorded restriction on authority. A recorded
grant of extraordinary authority, whether the grant concerns
real estate or other transactions, binds the partnership. RUPA
section 10X(c) provides:
(c) The filing of the statement . .. creates a conclusive pre-
sumption in favor of any bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer
of partnership property, or any creditor of the partnership giving
value, that the partners stated to be authorized to convey or
encumber partnership property or enter into other transactions on
behalf of the partnership are authorized to do so.
On the other hand, a recorded restriction on authority only
binds nonpartners who have actual knowledge of the restriction.
RUPA section 10X(d) provides:
(d) A statement of authority may limit or restrict the authority
of a partner granted under Section 9 to enter into transactions on
behalf of the partnership, but a limitation on or restriction of
authority... is effective only against persons who are not partners
if they have knowledge of the restriction or limitation.
The Drafting Committee felt that it would be unfair to bind
third parties to recorded restrictions on authority they were most
unlikely to consult.
The Committee rode a wave of populism that swept in from
California to exact disclosure of partnerships that exercise the
option to file a statement of partnership authority. Accordingly,
RUPA section 1OX(a)(2) provides that the statement must "list
the names and street addresses of either all of the partners or
of an agent who must be appointed and maintained by the
partnership and who must maintain a list of all partners and
make it available to any third party on request." I personally
do not see the need for imposing this disclosure tax on
partnerships. Given that the statements are likely to be filed at
the insistence of third parties, such as title insurance companies,
I see the "privilege" of recording as falling outside the
partnership. Further, the disclosure tax was imposed in our
discussion of RUPA section lOX before it became clear that
third parties will not be bound by constructive notice of
restrictions on authority. There might have been more of a
"privilege" if partnerships could have bound third parties by
[Vol. 21
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recorded restrictions on the power of their members to bind the
partnership. Finally, the imposition of the disclosure tax seems
to be second-guessing our basic policy decision that the statement
of authority provision is optional. 8 The disclosure will be
mandatory for partnerships that are forced to file by title
insurance companies or other creditors.
The latest draft of RUPA section loX has caused one member
to suggest that we reconsider RUPA section 9. The most
significant change in RUPA section 9 is the elimination of the
rule that was previously contained in UPA section 9(3). UPA
section 9(3) contained a list of actions that could not bind the
partnership unless there was unanimous consent. After discussing
revisions to the list in UPA section 9(3), the Drafting Committee
decided to eliminate the list completely. The elimination of the
list leaves it to the courts to place certain decisions outside the
actual, apparent or inherent authority of partners. It has been
suggested that we were willing to eliminate UPA section 9(3)
because the partnership was going to have an opportunity to
record restrictions on authority under RUPA section lOX. Now
it is clear that, although the partnership can record the
restrictions, they will have little or no effect because, they will
bind only third parties who know of them. According to this
view, RUPA section lOX would be more valuable if it provided
a way to bind third parties by recorded restrictions on authority.
The view that won the day, however, was that the case for
binding third parties had not been made.
V. NEw RULES ON PARTNERSHmp BREAKUPS
At the beginning of this century, the law of partnership
breakups was couched in terms of dissolution and was confused.
Dean William Draper Lewis, the Reporter who saw the UPA to
completion, thought that the concept of dissolution was perfectly
logical but sadly misunderstood. He said the source of the
8. Under RULPA, a certificate of limited partnership must be filed to
form a limited partnership, but it need not name the limited partners.
R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a). An office must be maintained at which certain records
are to be kept, including the name and business address of each limited
partner. Id. § 105(a)(1). These records are only subject to inspection and
copying at the request "of any partner." Id. § 105(b).
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confusion lay in the failure to give a consistent meaning to the
term dissolution. His solution to the confusion, which was
approved by the Conference and incorporated into the UPA,
was to continue with the term dissolution and define in the
statute both what dissolution is and is not. UPA section 29
states what dissolution is: "the change in the relation of the
partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the business."
UPA section 30 states what dissolution is not: "[o]n dissolution
the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding
up of partnership affairs is completed." All the UPA provisions
on partnership breakups are then activated by a dissolution.
Seventy-five years later, the law of partnership breakups is
still couched in terms of dissolution and it is still confused.
There are cases that find a dissolution and apply the strict logic
of dissolution even though justice would seem to require
otherwise. 9 There are cases that struggle to reach a right result
by refusing to find a dissolution even though the statute seems
to require a dissolution.'0 More basically, there are cases that
appear to reflect a complete misunderstanding of the concept
of dissolution as it is used in the statute."
Savor for a moment the UPA conception of dissolution as a
"change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on" of the business.
This definition of dissolution is actually an indirect definition
of partnership. More precisely, it is an aggregate conception
that a partnership is a unique aggregation of individuals, a
specific cast of characters. The cast is "dissolved" whenever
anyone leaves. Let us take as a simple example a firm of four
partners. Assume all the partners, including the departing
9. See Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
10. See Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938), in which the
court said that the death of a partner does not necessarily dissolve the
partnership, especially if the partner who dies is a passive investor.
11. In Great Hawaiian Fin. Corp. v. Aiu, 863 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1988),
the court stated that the withdrawal of three managing partners "indicates
that the original partnership including those partners was dissolved as to those
partners," but did not necessarily indicate that the partnership was dissolved
as to the remaining partners. Id. at 620 (emphasis added). The UPA does not
support the argument that the partnership is dissolved as to some partners
but not as to others.
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partners, happily and harmoniously agree the departing partner
will leave and the remaining partners will continue with the
business. In particular, assume it is agreed that the withdrawing
partner will neither be required to make any additional
contributions nor entitled to receive any additional distributions.
Cannot we just say that the partnership continues? That is what
the tax law says.' 2 No, says the UPA, the "old" partnership is
dissolved and a "new" partnership is created.
Could that possibly mean that property of the "old"
partnership must be conveyed to the "new" partnership? Yes it
could. 3 Could it possibly mean that contracts of the "old"
partnership lapse because the old partnership, the party to the
contract, no longer exists, leaving a "new" partnership that is
simply a stranger to the bargain? Yes it could. No, you might
protest in disbelief, those are not practical problems or likely
outcomes in the real world. Surely such fanciful arguments
demonstrate what is wrong with legal education today. Surely
the raising of such questions constitutes the worst of academic
hair-splitting. Surely this evening's speaker spent too many years
at the hands of the Jesuits.
I wish that I could tell you that these are fanciful problems
or issues that were satisfactorily resolved decades ago. But I
cannot. Consider the illustration of a recent case from this very
part of this very state. In Fairway Development Co. v. Title
Insurance Co. ,14 a real estate development partnership consisting
of three individuals took out a title insurance policy.
Subsequently, two of the partners "transferred not just their
interest in the partnership, i.e., their respective shares of profits
and surplus, but their entire respective bundles of partnership
rights" to the remaining partner and a third person." An
undisclosed pipeline easement was discovered and the surviving
partnership sued the title insurance company.
12. I.R.C. § 708 (1988).
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.1 (1989), which supplements the UPA. It
provides that if the partnership is dissolved but its business is continued
"without liquidation of the partnership affairs, the title to any real estate or
any interest therein vested in the dissolved or former partnership shall be
deemed to be transferred to and vested in such new partnership as may be
created by the remaining partners without further act or deed."
14. 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
15. Id. at 124.
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The court began its discussion with the "fundamental principle
of law" that "any change in the personnel of a partnership will
result in its dissolution.'1 6 Accordingly, the old partnership was
dead, a new partnership was born, and the new partnership had
no "standing" to bring the action because it was not a party
to the insurance contract. 7 The court was unimpressed with the
argument that, even if there was an "old" partnership and a
"new" partnership, all members of both partnerships intended
the new partnership to continue with all the rights and liabilities
of the old partnership.' 8
The problem with the UPA's use of the term dissolution is
clearly much more fundamental than the absence of explicit
definition. The problem is with the way dissolution is defined
and the role it is given in the statute. The basic problem with
dissolution under the UPA is that it is an aggregate concept
that fails to recognize the stability of partnerships as business
16. Id. at 122. The court reiterated its strict aggregate approach by stating
that UPA § 41(1) "seems to assume that a dissolution occurs upon the
admission of a new partner or the retirement of an old partner." Id. at 123.
17. Id. at 125. The court said its approach "accords with the aggregate
theory of partnership, which, applied to these cases, recognizes Fairway
Development I not as an entity in itself, but as a partnership made up of
three members .... That partnership ceased when the membership of the
partnership changed." Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 121. In addition to the UPA provisions, the Ohio statutes also
contained a special supplement on fraud in partnership affairs and the use of
fictitious names in partnerships. Partnerships transacting business in Ohio
under names that are fictitious or do not reveal the names of all the partners
must record a certificate stating the name and residence of each partner. Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1777.02 (Anderson 1985). The Fairway Development court
found significance in the requirement to file a new certificate whenever there
is a change in membership in a registered partnership. 621 F. Supp. at 123.
See OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 1777.03 (Anderson 1985). Incorrectly assuming
that the special Ohio provisions are part of the UPA, the court found them
further support for the aggregate theory:
[Wihere members of a general partnership change, the partnership must
file a new certificate of partnership, unlike a limited partnership, which
simply may amend its certificate of partnership. The fact that the Uniform
Partnership Law makes this distinction supports a finding that the authors
of the Uniform Partnership Act recognized that a change of the members
of a general partnership in fact changes the original partnership and
creates a new partnership requiring a new certificate, as opposed to an
amendment to the original certificate.
621 F. Supp. at 123.
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organizations. Most law students are asked to consider at the
extreme the law firm with one hundred partners. Does the firm
technically dissolve and reform every time a member leaves?
Yes, they are likely to be told, at least in most jurisdictions.
Does that dissolution of the old partnership and the creation of
a new partnership have any practical significance apart from
Fairway Development-type problems? Stated differently, does
the dissolution have any consequences as among the partners?
That depends, they are probably told, on whether there is a
continuation agreement. The same questions and answers arise
in the context of small partnerships. The UPA actually destabilizes
some partnerships. The UPA suggests that the partnership
business is coming to a close when it may not be. All that may
be coming to a close is one person's participation. In short, the
UPA does not adequately distinguish a departure that triggers
a winding up of the business from a departure that does not.
Consider the policy goals that must be achieved when a partner
leaves. Let us return to our simple example of the four-person
firm of contented partners. Assume, once again, that one of
the four will withdraw from the business and the remaining
three will continue the business. Assume, now, however, that
the withdrawing partner is entitled to a payment for her equity
in the business. There are three basic things the partnership
statute must do. First, it must end the power of the withdrawing
partner to bind the partners she has just left. Second, it must
end the power of the continuing partners to bind the withdrawing
partner. Third, it must pay the withdrawing partner her equity.
The UPA provides that the partnership must be dissolved before
any of these things can be done. The UPA breakup provisions
are all triggered by dissolution. Yet it may not be necessary to
declare the partnership dissolved to do any of these things. For
the sake of simplicity, why not let the partnership continue if
the business is to continue?
The provisions of RUPA were drafted without the use of the
word dissolution., For almost two years, the project proceeded
without the use of "the D word." The provisions in RUPA
reached their present structure and substance without the use of
the D word. RUPA has three central provisions on partnership
breakups. RUPA section 31 lists all the ways in which one ceases
to be a partner. RUPA section 31Y identifies the cessations that
will cause a winding up of the business of the partnership.
RUPA section 32 states that all other cessations will result only
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in a buyout of the departing partner and not a winding up of
the business.
The term "ceases to be a partner" is awkward, but the
Drafting Committee felt it was more precise than the term
"withdrawal." The group did not think the term withdrawal
was appropriate, for example, in cases of expulsion. Under
RUPA, the cessation of partner status triggers the rules that
achieve the first two policy objectives: (1) end the power of the
departing partner to bind the others; and (2) end the power of
the others to bind the departing partner. The third policy
objective is then achieved in one of two ways, depending upon
the reason for cessation of partner status. Some cessations of
partner status will trigger a winding up of the partnership
business. RUPA section 31Y lists the cessations that trigger a
winding up of the business. If a winding up is triggered, the
partnership assets must be applied to discharge its liabilities and
any surplus paid in cash to the partners. On the other hand,
other cessations will not result in a winding up of the business
but will only result in a buyout of the departing partner by the
partners who continue with the business. RUPA section 32
provides that, if a cessation does not cause a winding up under
RUPA section 31Y, the departing partner must be bought out.
RUPA section 32(a) provides that if a person ceases to be a
partner but no event triggers a winding up, the partnership
"shall purchase the interest of the person who ceases to be a
partner for its fair market value." RUPA section 32(f), however,
provides that a partner who has withdrawn by express will prior
to the expiration of a specified term or undertaking need not
be paid any portion of the value of her interest until the
expiration of the term or undertaking, unless she persuades a
court that payment should be made over a lesser term.
RUPA section 32(b) attempts to give some guidance on "fair
market value," recognizing the difficulty in determining value
in the context of closely-held businesses. It begins with the rule
drawn from case law that the fair market value "shall be
determined as of the moment of the event causing cessation."' 9
The fair market value of the interest is defined as "the amount
that would have been distributable to that person in a winding
up of the partnership business." The sense of the statute is
19. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).
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that, theoretically, the departing partner should get the same
amount through the buyout route that she would get if the
business were wound up.
To determine the amount that would have been distributed in
a winding up, RUPA section 32(b) provides that partnership
assets "must be valued at the greater of (i) liquidation value or
(ii) value based on sale of the entire business as a going concern
without ,the departing partner." This language is intended to
cut through some of the confusion in the partnership cases
concerning the term going concern value. I grew up thinking of
"going concern value" as a term that meant that assets have
greater value if they are part of a going concern. On the other
hand, there is recent partnership case law that states that going
concern value is lower than liquidation value if the assets cannot
be liquidated because they are committed to a going concern. 20
In effect, dedication to a going concern is seen as an
encumbrance.
Whether liquidation value or going concern value is used,
RUPA section 32(b) provides that the assets are to be valued
"on the basis of the price that would be paid by a willing buyer
to a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell, and with the knowledge of all relevant facts." The
"willing buyer-willing seller" standard is taken from the estate
tax regulations, which are also used for income tax purposes. 2'
RUPA section 32(b) also contains a parentalistic rule that was
included primarily to protect the spouse of a deceased partner.
In the case of "a partnership in which capital is a material
income producing factor, regularly scheduled distributions must
continue to be made to the former partner or successor in
interest." Our sense was that the surviving partners should not
be permitted to cut off all distributions to pressure a buyout at
a low price. The concept of a partnership in which capital is a
material income producing factor has long been in the family
partnership rules. 22
So there you have the basic architecture of the RUPA
provisions on partnership breakups. Many hours of drafting
and discussion went into the new rules, which were forged
20. See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 483 (1lth Cir. 1987),
affg 51 T.C.M. 60 (CCH) (1985).
21. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965).
22. I.R.C. § 704(e) (1988).
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without the use of the term dissolution. At the very last hour
of our most recent meeting, the word dissolution was put back
into the statute. This is not to say that the suggestion was only
raised at the eleventh-hour. Quite the contrary. Throughout the
project, there have been those who have expressed the desire to
reinstate the word dissolution. They were asked to hold this
suggestion, to give us a chance to see the kind of statute we
could craft without "the D word." They finally had a chance
to state their case, and the Drafting Committee at its latest
meeting decided that the word could be added back into the
statute without the need to change either the basic structure we
had drafted or the substantive decisions we had hung on that
structure. Accordingly, RUPA section 29 provides: "A
partnership is dissolved when an event causes the winding up
of its business under Section 31Y." RUPA section 31Y, in turn,
begins by stating that "[a] partnership is dissolved and its
business shall be wound up on the occurrence of" certain events.
This echoes the language at the beginning of RULPA section
801 that a limited partnership "is dissolved and its affairs shall
be wound up upon the happening" of certain events.
The Drafting Committee was told that there would be strong
opposition to RUPA if the word dissolution were deleted. Why?
First, not everyone believes that the term dissolution causes
confusion. Why else? Second, RULPA uses the word dissolution,
and there are those who believe that RUPA should follow
RULPA whenever possible. Why else? These reasons do not
seem adequate to explain the intense and unceasing insistence
on the use of one word. Would RUPA's elimination of the
word dissolution have left the law of general partnerships in a
more confused state? I do not think so. The suggestion was
that RUPA could cause trouble for limited partnerships,
particularly those with sole corporate general partners, by
providing an occasion for the Treasury Department to reconsider
the regulations that distinguish partnerships from corporations
for tax purposes.
The limited partnership is a corporate antecedent, an historical
compromise on the road to general incorporation acts. It is
therefore not surprising that questions have been raised about
the proper tax classification of limited partnerships, particularly
those with sole corporate general partners.2 3 The Treasury
23. For a brief history of limited partnerships in the United States that
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Regulations that distinguish a partnership from a corporation
for tax purposes are known as the "association" regulations.2
Those regulations identify four characteristics that tend to be
found in a "pure corporation," and state that three of the four
must be present before an organization will be classified as a
corporation. This "numerical supremacy" test provides that, if
only two of these characteristics are present, partnership
classification results. Stated from the point of view of someone
who hopes to classify a limited partnership as a partnership for
tax purposes, the goal is to eliminate any two of the corporate
characteristics.
The association regulations are highly formalistic and the
characteristics are defined in bizarre ways. Continuity of life is
one of the four characteristics that limited partnerships typically
say is not present. The elimination of continuity of life is a
"freebie" in the sense that it is a characteristic that is eliminated
independent of the particular features of the limited partnership.
It can be eliminated as a formalistic matter because the regulations
state that continuity of life is not present if the departure of
any partner causes a "dissolution. ' 25 Take away the dissolution,
includes a discussion of the tax classification issue, see Weidner, The Existence
of State and Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1, 46-92
(1983).
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1983).
25. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1):
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a
dissolution of the organization. On the other hand, if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not exist.
The regulations state that it does not matter if the partners have a continuation
agreement, so long as a dissolution takes place:
An agreement by which an organization is established may provide that
the business will be continued by the remaining members in the event of
the death or withdrawal of any member, but such agreement does not
establish continuity of life if under local law the death or withdrawal of
any member causes a dissolution of the organization. Thus, there may be
a dissolution of the organization and no continuity of life although the
business is continued by the remaining members.
Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2). Even though the partner who dissolves in contravention
of the agreement has lesser rights than one who dissolves in accordance with
the agreement and can be liable for breach, the power to dissolve precludes
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it is argued, and you may make it more difficult for limited
partnerships to argue that the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life is negated.
I have two basic responses to the argument that the word
dissolution should be retained to preserve present tax classification
results. First, RULPA has received the endorsement of the
Internal Revenue Service2 even though as a formal matter it
eliminates dissolution in many situations. Under RULPA, many
withdrawals of general partners no longer result in dissolutions.27
a finding of continuity of life:
[I]f the agreement provides that the organization is to continue for a
stated period or until the completion of a stated transaction, the organi-
zation has continuity of life if the effect of the agreement is that no
member has the power to dissolve the organization in contravention of
the agreement. Nevertheless, if, notwithstanding such agreement any mem-
ber has the power under local law to dissolve the organization, the
organization lacks continuity of life. Accordingly, a general partnership
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act and a
limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of life.
Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(3). This last sentence has been referred to as "the shorthand
test" to determine whether a limited partnership has continuity of life. It
appears, however, not to be a test but a flat rule that ULPA limited
partnerships do not have continuity of life.
26. Rev. Rul. 89-123, 1989-47 C.B. 9.
27. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(4) is far from a model of clarity on this point:
§ 801. Nonjudicial Dissolution
A limited partnership is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up
upon the happening of the first to occur of the following:
(4) an event of withdrawal of a general partner unless at the time there
is at least one other general partner and the written provisions of the
partnership agreement permit the business of the limited partnership to
be carried on by the remaining general partner and that partner does so,
but the limited partnership is not dissolved and is not required to be
wound up by reason of any event of withdrawal, if, within 90 days after
the withdrawal, all partners agree in writing to continue the business of
the limited partnership and to the appointment of one or more additional
general partners if necessary or desired ....
It is unclear how this provision meshes with the UPA rules on breakups,
which as a general matter are only activated by a dissolution. See U.P.A. §§
34-43. For example, assume that a general partner withdraws from a limited
partnership operating under an agreement that gives the remaining general
partner the right to continue the business. If the remaining general partner
does so and there is no dissolution because of R.U.L.P.A. § 801(4), what
rules end the authority of the departing partner to bind the partnership?
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Second, more basically and wholly apart from the formal
elimination of the word dissolution, RUPA retains the substantive
rules of the UPA that as a practical matter deprive partnerships
of continuity of life in the corporate sense.
The key to the elimination of continuity of life is discussed
in Larson v. Commissioner,28 the leading case interpreting the
association regulations. The various opinions in Larson recognized
that the regulations are highly formalistic but nevertheless tried
to make some sense out of them. Judge Tannenwald's majority
opinion contains the following trenchant observation about why
partnerships do not have continuity of life in a corporate sense:
The significant difference between a corporation and a partnership
as regards continuity of life, then, is that a partner can always
opt out of continued participation in and exposure to the risks of
the enterprise. A corporate shareholder's investment is locked in
unless liquidation is voted or he can find a purchaser to buy him
out.
29
RUPA does not change the basic UPA rules that permit partners
to cash out of partnerships at any time. As indicated above,
the Drafting Committee expressly rejected the suggestion to
make partnerships for a specified term or undertaking specifically
enforceable. RUPA section 31(1) continues the traditional rule
that every partner has the power to withdraw from the partnership
at any time. The Committee also rejected the suggestion that
we eliminate the UPA right of each member of an at-will
partnership to force a liquidation of the business.30 If the
28. 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2.
29. 66 T.C. at 173-74.
30. See Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 357, 395-96 (1987):
[Tihe parties to a partnership relationship would not be likely to give
each partner the right to liquidate at will. Because liquidation at will is
ordinarily beneficial in terms of valuation of the partnership assets only
if accompanied by a costly squeezeout, liquidation at will offers the
partners only the opportunity to be on the winning side of a zero-sum
reallocation of values among the partners. If the partners do not know
ex ante whether they will be winners or losers, they have little to gain by
gambling in this way. If the partners can predict who will benefit from
a liquidation right, it is unlikely the potential losers will agree unless they
are offered strong inducements under a customized agreement. By corn-
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partnership is at-will, RUPA section 31Y(1) gives the withdrawing
partner the same right she had under the UPA to demand that
the partnership business be liquidated so that its liabilities can
be satisfied and she can be paid her equity in cash.' If there is
a binding continuation agreement, however, the withdrawing
partner has, as she did under the UPA, only the right to be
paid for the fair market value of her interest by the continuing
partners.
Nevertheless, responded those who wanted "dissolution"
reinstated, the deletion of the word would invite the Treasury
to reconsider the association regulations. Unfortunately, I have
no logic to dispel this objection. The question is essentially a
political one. Can I say as a matter of fact that the deletion of
the word dissolution will not cause the Treasury to reconsider
its regulations? No, I cannot. Can I say that if I were relentless
in the protection of my limited partnership clients, I would not
make the same objection? No I cannot. I can only point out as
an academic that a significant improvement in the law of general
partnerships is being defeated because it might prompt the
Treasury to reopen a longstanding issue of federal tax policy.
Because the tax classification issue is revisited every few years,
the fear is really only that it will be revisited sooner rather than
later. Indeed, it may not be the limited partnership but the
current excitement about the limited liability company that next
lets the tax classification cat out of the bag. Finally, even if it
is assumed that the issue were forced sooner rather than later,
historical experience suggests that limited partnerships that are
not publicly traded will win and those who wish to classify them
as corporations will lose.3 2
parison, the buyout right is desireable [sic] because it offers all of the
partners, including those who are unlikely to be able to use the buyout
as a squeeze-out device, a cost-efficient way to reduce the substantial
risks associated with illiquidity.
31. RUPA § 31Y(l) provides that the business of the partnership shall be
wound up "on the giving of notice by one partner to another partner of the
first partner's express will to withdraw as a partner, unless the partners,
including the withdrawing partner, agree in the partnership agreement or at
any other time that the business of the partnership be continued by the
remaining partners." Compare Urw. PARTNasxmI ACT § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. 356
(1914).
32. In 1982, the American Law Institute approved its Federal Income Tax
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On the other hand, even after the word dissolution is reinstated,
RUPA's new rules on breakups constitute a major improvement
in the law. Dissolution is redefined in a more workable way to
refer to the commencement of the winding up of the business
rather than the departure of any partner; I believe the definition
and use of the term dissolution in RUPA's latest draft are far
preferable to the definition and use of the term in the UPA.
Although RUPA's provisions are more lengthy than present law,
the length adds clarity. The new rules present a much clearer
roadmap to buyouts versus liquidations, and they define the
buyout. The partnership statute is for the small business people
of America, for ranchers, farmers, merchants, and small
manufacturers. They and their attorneys and accountants have
under RUPA a statute that much more clearly than ever tells
them of the rights they have when they break up.
VI. FIDucIARY DUTms OF PARTNERS
Traditional analysis of fiduciary duties distinguishes the duty
of care from the duty of loyalty. This is true in the general law
of principal and agent,33 and in the law of corporations.3 4 The
Project on Subchapter K. Proposal Q would classify all Uniform Act limited
partnerships as partnerships unless they are publicly traded. A.L.I. FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K, PROPOSALS ON TFE TAXATION OF PART-
NERS 366 (1984). The Revenue Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203, added I.R.C. §
7704, under which certain publicly traded partnerships are treated as corpo-
rations.
33. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1957) ("Duty of
Care and Skill") with RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 387 ("General
Principle") animating the "Duties of Loyalty" in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 388-98.
34. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act distinguishes the duty
of care from the duty of loyalty by providing separate sections on General
Standards for Directors, duty of care, and on Director Conflict of Interest,
duty of loyalty. REv. MODEL Busn-Ess CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (1984).
Similarly, the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project contin-
ues the distinction. The Institute's treatment of the duty of loyalty begins with
the following statement of its relation to the duty of care:
[B]oth analytically and normatively the principle of loyalty precedes that
of due care. Analytically, the principle of loyalty has primacy in that the
duty of care entails the principle of loyalty. As stated in § 4.01(a) of
Tentative Draft No. 4, the conduct of an officer or director conforms to
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UPA has no duty of care provision. It does, however, have a
duty of loyalty provision of sorts in UPA section 21(1):
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit,
and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from
any use by him of its property. 5
Although a basic purpose of UPA section 21(1) was to give
excluded partners priority over the separate creditors of the
disloyal partner as to traceable usurped assets,36 it has been
treated by courts as the statutory foundation for powerful
fiduciary duties among partners, particularly duties of loyalty.
It may be best to begin with the latest draft of RUPA's
fiduciary duty provision and explain its history. RUPA section
21 is couched in terms of an integrated and exclusive statement
of the fiduciary duties of partners:
SECTION 21. PARTNER ACCOUNTABLE AS A FIDUCI-
ARY DUTIES OF A PARTNER.
A partner's only fiduciary duties are the duty of good faith
and fair dealing and the duty of loyalty [and the duty of care]
set out in this Section.
(a) A partner has a duty of good faith and fair dealing towards
the partnership and the other partners in all matters related to
the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership. This
the duty of care when it is "in good faith, in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation . . . ." Normatively,
the principle of loyalty to the corporation specifies the direction in which
the efforts are to be made that are regulated by the due care requirement.
Hazard, Foreword to A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANAL-
YSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ix (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1986).
35. UNIF. PARTNERSHip ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258 (1914).
36. Id. at § 21(1) comment, 6 U.L.A. at 258. The comment states:
A, B and C are partners; A, as a result of a transaction connected with
the conduct of the partnership, has in his hands, so that it may be traced,
a specific sum of money or other property. A is insolvent. Is the claim
of the partnership against A a claim against him as an ordinary creditor,
or is it a claim to the specific property or money in his hands? The words
"and hold as trustee for the partnership any profits" indicate clearly that




general duty of good faith and fair dealing may not be varied by
agreement, but the parties by agreement may identify specific
conduct that does not violate the general duty of good faith and
fair dealing. A partner shall not be considered to have violated
the general duty of good faith and fair dealing merely because
the partner's actions furthered that partner's individual interest.
(b) A partner has a duty of loyalty to the partnership and the
other partners that is limited to the following:
(1) Every patnr must to account to the partnership fo ny
benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit prefits
derived by the partner him without the informed consent of the
other partners, from any transaction connected with the forma-
tion, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any
personal use by-him of its partnership property;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership as, or on behalf
of, an adverse party without the informed consent of the part-
nership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership without the
informed consent of the partnership.
This Section 21(b) does not preclude a partner from purchasing
the assets of the partnership in a foreclosure sale or upon liqui-
dation of the partnership.
(c) [a duty of care rule is under study]
(d)(2) This Section 21 seetien applies also to the personal
representatives of a deceased partner or the legal representatives
of any other partner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of
the partnership as the legal pe s nl representatives of the last
surviving partner.
Before considering the three separate duties listed in RUPA
section 21, it is important to note that there are those who are
disappointed with the continued use of the word "fiduciary."
The title and first sentence of RUPA section 21 include the
word fiduciary even though the Drafting Committee was
repeatedly urged to purge the word fiduciary from RUPA. The
very word is troublesome, the sentiment seemed to be, because
it is subject to abuse in the hands of judges, academics and
others whose flow of satisfactions is derived in far too large a
part from imposing their personal values on the more productive
members of society. It was said that a partner is not a fiduciary
in the same strict sense as a trustee. 7 It was said that a trustee
37. See REv. MODEL Busnq-ss CORP. ACT § 8.30 comment (1984). Comment
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is a person who acts solely on behalf of a beneficiary, whereas
a partner by definition is a co-proprietor, a co-owner acting on
his own behalf.
The Drafting Committee, however, retained the word fiduciary,
apparently persuaded by the argument that the law of partnership
is deeply rooted in the law of agency. Under UPA section 9,
every partner is a general agent of the partnership, and under
UPA section 4(3), "[tlhe law of agency shall apply under this
act." The black letter law of principal and agent is that every
agent is a fiduciary. 38
A. Duty of Care
An earlier draft of RUPA contained a duty of care rule based
on Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") section 8.30(a).
The rule provided that a partner "managing or conducting the
affairs of the partnership" has a duty to act: "(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner
he [or she] reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
partnership." Like its MBCA predecessor, the rule was designed
so that managers would not be liable for every incorrect decision.
The intent of the rule was to focus "on the manner in which
the [partner] performs his duties, not the correctness of his
decisions. ' 39 Under this approach, if a decision is properly
1 states that "[l]ikewise, Section 8.30 does not use the term 'fiduciary' in the
standard for directors' conduct, because that term could be confused with the
unique attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts,
some of which are not appropriate for directors of a corporation."
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957) states that "[a]gency
is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to
his control, and consent by the other so to act."
39. REv. MODEL BusiEss CORP. ACT § 8.30 comment (1984), which also
provides:
In determining whether to impose liability, the courts recognize that
boards of directors and corporate managers continuously make decisions
that involve the balancing of risks and benefits for the enterprise. Although
some decisions turn out to be unwise or the result of a mistake of
judgment, it is unreasonable to reexamine these decisions with the benefit
of hindsight. Therefore, a director is not liable for injury or damage
caused by his decision, no matter how unwise or mistaken it may turn




reached, even if the decision ultimately proves to be a bad one,
the partner will not be liable. The inclusion of this language in
RUPA would have had the additional advantage that it would
be familiar to many from the corporate context.
The Drafting Committee retained the good faith component
of the duty of care rule and made it part of the new integrated
fiduciary duty provision. It has for the moment rejected the rest
of the rule because it is not yet prepared to impose a "prudent
person" liability rule among partners. "Reasonable care" was
at one point offered as a lesser standard and also rejected.
"Standard care" and skill is the normal standard for a paid
agent. 40 The sense of the Committee, however, seemed to be
that part of being a partner is throwing in your lot with your
fellow partners to the extent of assuming the risk of their
ordinary negligence. Stated differently, the initial Committee
reaction appeared to be that the default rule should require
partners to share the losses caused by each other's ordinary
negligence. There was some sense that a "gross negligence"
standard is appropriate, but the Committee is reluctant to put
the term in the statute.
The leading text on partnerships says that partners "are not
subject to the ordinary care standard applicable to a paid
agent.' 14 Indeed, the authors appear to endorse the absence of
a reasonable care standard:
The difference between a partner and a paid agent is, of course,
that the partner is subject to individual liability for partnership
debts, so that legal liability is less necessary to encourage the
agent to act carefully. Because of this individual liability, perhaps
a partner should also be distinguished from a corporate director. 42
Even if a reasonable care standard is not "necessary" to
encourage due care, however, it might be appropriate as a matter
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1957):
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the
principal to act with standard care and with the skill which is standard
in the locality for the kind of work which he is employed to perform
and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has.




of fairness among partners. If a ten percent partner negligently
shatters $X of partnership property, why should ninety percent
of the loss be borne by the other partners? What if the partner's
negligence causes a loss to a third party that not only wipes out
all partnership assets but also causes the ninety percent partners
to lose their separate assets? Is the goal of distributive justice
among partners served if the scrupulously careful ninety percent
are wiped out and denied the right to be indemnified by the
negligent actor?
In addition, there are both old and new statements that
partners are subject to an ordinary care standard. Writing in
1841, for example, Mr. Justice Story opined that "good faith,
reasonable skill and diligence, and the exercise of sound judgment
and discretion, are naturally, if not necessarily, implied from
the very nature and character of the relation of partnership. ' 43
He traced the principle to Roman law, which he summarized as
follows: "[I]n cases of partnership the same diligence is ordinarily
required of each partner, as reasonable and prudent men generally
employ about the like business; unless the circumstances of the
particular case repel such a conclusion." 44
Much more recently, the Supreme Court of Maine has said
that partners are subject to an "ordinary prudent person"
standard. In Rosenthal v. Rosenthal,45 the court presented an
integrated statement of the fiduciary duties of partners and
directors:
The presiding justice set forth the following four specific fiduciary
duties owed by the business associates to each other:
(1) To act with that degree of diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under similar circum-
stances in like positions;
(2) To discharge the duties affecting their relationship in good
faith with a view to furthering the interests of one another as to
the matters within the scope of the relationship;
(3) To disclose and not withhold from one another relevant
information affecting the status and affairs of the relationship;
(4) To not use their position, influence or knowledge respecting
the affairs and organization that are subject to the relationship
43. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHm 261 (1841).
44. Id. at 263.
45. 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988).
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to gain any special privilege or advantage over the other person
or persons involved in the relationship.
This delineation of fiduciary obligation reflects accurately the
duties of care and loyalty owed under Maine law by a corporate
director to the corporation and its shareholders, as well as the
duties of a partner to the partnership and his fellow partners.4
The Rosenthal statement is instructive for a number of reasons.
First, it retains the word fiduciary. Second, it uses a prudent
person standard. 47 Third, it puts the partner and the director
on a level playing field. Fourth, it defines the fiduciary duties
of partners in aggregate terms. It defines a partner's duties "as
including 'furthering the interests of one another,' rather than
being restricted to furthering the interests of the business
enterprise." Fifth, the court concluded with the caveat that the
general fiduciary standards are qualified by the business judgment
rule. 48
The elegance and simplicity of the Rosenthal statement are
sufficient reason to keep it in mind. However, it also raises the
question about the contribution of RUPA in this area. Assume,
for example, that a final draft of RUPA were to contain a
gross negligence standard. Assume that a member of the Maine
legislature is attempting to decide whether to vote to enact
RUPA in Maine and asks what effect it will have on the law
of his state. After Rosenthal, would RUPA not decrease the
duty of care of partners and in so doing create a distinction
between partners and directors? I am not sure the Committee
46. Id. at 352.
47. See also Roper v. Thomas, 60 N.C. App. 64, 298 S.E.2d 424 (1982),
in which the court said it was "meritless" to argue that a general partner
"may be personally liable for gross neglect of his duties, mismanagement,
fraud and deceit resulting in loss to a third person, but not for error of
judgment made in good faith." Id. at 72, 298 S.E.2d at 429.
48. The Seventh Circuit recently made a similar comparison of the obli-
gations of partners and directors. In Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 12 (7th
Cir. 1989), a retired partner sued the managing partners of his former firm
for negligently causing his retirement benefits to be eliminated. Even if you
assume that the managing partners are the fiduciaries of a former partner,
wrote Judge Posner, "the business-judgment rule would shield them from
liability for mere negligence in the operation of the firm, just as it would
shield a corporation's directors and officers, who are fiduciaries of the
shareholders." Id. at 14.
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is ready to craft a statute that would reduce the fiduciary duties
of partners in this way. In light of the conflicting statements
on the duty of care and the importance of the question, the
Committee has decided to give the duty of care rule further
study.
B. The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The duty of good faith that was in RUPA's original duty of
care rule was moved to RUPA section 21(a), which provides
that each partner "has a duty of good faith and fair dealing
towards the partnership and the other partners in all matters
related to the formation, conduct or liquidation of the
partnership." The reference to "the partnership and the other
partners" indicates that both entity and aggregate approaches
are appropriate to decide whether the duty of good faith and
fair dealing has been satisfied. The concern was with oppressive
behavior toward a particular partner that might nevertheless be
of benefit to the entity as a whole.
The general duty of good faith and fair dealing "may not be
varied by agreement, but the parties by agreement may identify
specific conduct that does not violate" it. This last language is
drawn from the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") rule
that says that the duty of good faith "may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which performance . . . is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable." 49 The non-waivable
nature of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is clear because
it is listed in RUPA section 4X. Indeed, it is striking that no
other fiduciary duties are listed in RUPA section 4X. The result
is that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is mandatory
and all the other fiduciary duties are simply default rules. On
49. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1983). It is interesting that the U.C.C. has three
different concepts: the document, the agreement and the contract. The doc-
ument is the piece of paper that states rights and obligations. Id. § 1-201(15).
The agreement, on the other hand, is "the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances .... "
Id. § 1-201(3). Contract, under the U.C.C., means "the total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any
other applicable rules of law." Id. § 1-201(11). A contract under the U.C.C.,
therefore, includes mandatory rules.
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the one hand, the duty of good faith and fair dealing might be
considered a relatively weak duty because it is from the contract
law that governs adversarial relationships. Indeed, the U.C.C.
has a general definition of good faith that states that good faith
is simply "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." 50 On the other hand, the U.C.C. is more exacting
in the case of a merchant, for whom good faith "means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade." 5' In addition, there is authority
that suggests that the duty of good faith will be given a much
more powerful reading in the partnership context.5 2
The last sentence in RUPA section 21(a) is an attempt to
recognize and protect the legitimate pursuit of self-interest by a
partner. It provides that a partner "shall not be considered to
have violated the general duty of good faith and fair dealing
merely because the partner's actions furthered that partner's
individual interest." After all, RUPA seems to say, if other
adversaries can pursue their own self-interest, so can partners.
It was argued that partnership is a dynamic, not a static
relationship, and that partners have a right to rebargain for a
larger piece of the collective pie. Yet the contrary is suggested
by judicial opinions that declare a vague yet powerful duty of
loyalty. To clarify the law, the argument concludes, the statute
should reflect the legitimate pursuit of self-interest that has been
approved by the case law holdings, even if it is not protected
by case law language. 3
50. Id. § 1-201(19).
51. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). This definition of good faith applies for purposes of
article 2 "unless the context otherwise requires." The definition of "merchant"
in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) is extremely broad.
52. See Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr.
643, 648 (1961), in which the court said that the power to dissolve a partnership
at will is confined by the duty of good faith, which it seemed to equate with
a powerful duty of loyalty. Page is criticized in R. HILLMAN, LAw FIRM
BREAKuPs 81-84 (1990). See also Donahue v. Rood Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 587, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975), in which the court said partners owe
each other the "utmost good faith and loyalty," referring repeatedly to a
"strict good faith standard."
53. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv.
425, 454-70 (1987).
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C. Duty of Loyalty
RUPA section 21(b) purports to be an exclusive statement of
the duty of loyalty of partners. It provides that every partner
has a duty of loyalty "that is limited to" three rules. The rule
was motivated by a sense that vague, broad statements of a
powerful duty of loyalty cause too much uncertainty. It was
said that, even if there are no bad holdings, overly broad judicial
language has left practitioners uncertain about whether their
negotiated agreement will be voided. It was said that practicing
attorneys want to be able to reach a deal, put it down on paper
and know that it will not be undone by the application of
fiduciary duties. RUPA sections 4X and 21 now provide an
exclusive checklist of the duties of loyalty and further provide
that they can all be drafted away.
First, RUPA section 21(b)(1) provides that every partner has
a duty "to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for
it any profit or benefit derived by the partner without the
informed consent of the other partners, from any transaction
connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any personal use of partnership property."
This is drawn virtually unchanged from UPA section 21(1), and
will probably continue to be viewed as the statutory foundation
of a broad and powerful duty of loyalty.
The final two duty of loyalty rules in RUPA section 21(b)(2)
and (3) are new to the partnership act. RUPA section 21(b)(2)
provides that each partner has a duty "to refrain from dealing
with the partnership as, or on 'behalf of, an adverse party
without the informed consent of the partnership." RUPA section
21(b)(3) provides that each partner has a duty "to refrain from
competing with the partnership without the informed consent
of the partnership." Neither of these rules, however, is new to
the law. They are drawn from sections 389 and 393 of the
Second Restatement of Agency.
Interestingly, the Drafting Committee deleted the "general
principle" that the Restatement describes as animating the specific
rules that were included:
§ 387. General Principle
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his
principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters
connected with his agency.
[Vol. 21
POLICY DECISIONS
Eliminating this rule of abnegation of self is consistent with the
earlier decision that the good faith duty is not violated "merely
because the partner's actions furthered that partner's individual
interest." The flush language at the end of RUPA section 21(b)
is a more narrow reiteration of the legitimate self interest point.
It provides that the duty of loyalty "does not preclude a partner
from purchasing the assets of the partnership in a foreclosure
sale or upon liquidation of the partnership." In part this reflects
the general notion that a partner is an owner who naturally will
pursue his own self-interest. In part it is an attempt to confirm
that dual-capacity transactions do not violate the duty of loyalty.5 '
In particular, the goal was to confirm that a person may be
both a partner and a lender. Wearing the hat of lender, lender
remedies may be pursued.
D. Summary of RUPA Section 21
In summary, RUPA section 21 turned into a battleground
between the libertarians and the parentalists. The results are
equivocal. On the one hand, the libertarians achieved a victory
to the extent that RUPA section 21 can be seen as a three-
prong attempt to restrain judicial imposition of fiduciary duties:
(1) it purports to be an exclusive statement of fiduciary duties,
which in turn purports to include an exclusive list of the duties
of loyalty; (2) in conjunction with RUPA section 4X, it makes
it clear that all fiduciary duties other than the duty of good
faith and fair dealing are merely default rules; and (3) it gives
statutory legitimacy to the pursuit of individual self-interest.
The second is probably the sweetest victory for the libertarians,
who hold sacred that fiduciary duties are merely default rules
and not mandatory." On the other hand, the parentalists can
also claim victory for two basic reasons: (1) RUPA continues
to use the term fiduciary; and (2) RUPA section 21(b)(1) continues
54. Compare Uiu. LTD. PARTNERSHIp ACT § 107, 6 U.L.A. 275 (Supp.
1990), which states that "a partner may lend money to and transact other
business with the limited partnership and, subject to other applicable law, has
the same rights and obligations with respect thereto as a person who is not a
partner." See also I.R.C. § 707(a) (1988).
55. 2 A. BROMBERO & L. RmsTEn, supra note 41, § 6.07(a), which states
that "[fliduciary duties are essentially part of the standard form contract that
governs partnerships in the absence of contrary agreement."
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the language from UPA section 21(1) that the courts have treated
as the statutory foundation for a vague and powerful duty of
loyalty. The forces are likely to collide once again when the
Conference reviews RUPA section 21 and when the Drafting
Committee reconsiders a duty of care rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The task of Reporter is difficult for various reasons, only one
of which is the amount of work involved. The role is an awkward
one. The Reporter is expected to have and express his own
opinions. At the same time, the Reporter should refrain from
any attempt to force his opinions on the Drafting Committee.
It is the job of Reporter to serve the Drafting Committee, not
the reverse. It has been my job, my honor and my pleasure to
listen, to learn and to try to be of some help. I have learned
an enormous amount from a truly extraordinary Drafting
Committee, a group that has persuaded me to change my opinion
on many matters. Indeed, the group has given me many sharp
perceptions where before I had none.
Happily, I find myself an enthusiastic supporter of most of
the major policy decisions of the Drafting Committee. There is
virtual unanimity that RUPA should make a major move away
from the aggregate theory and closer to the entity theory.5 6
There is also a strong consensus that most of the rules in RUPA
that govern the relations among partners should be default rules
rather than mandatory rules. There is also a remarkable consensus
that RUPA should include a statement of partnership authority
provision that binds the partnership to recorded declarations of
extraordinary grants of authority. There is strong consensus that
RUPA should give more guidance on the fiduciary duties of
partners. Finally, there is a strong consensus that the UPA
provisions on partnership breakups need major overhaul. In
particular, there is strong consensus that we have improved the
statute by restructuring it to distinguish departures that result
in a buyout of the departing partner from departures that trigger
a winding up of the business of the partnership. Most specifically,
there is strong agreement that if the term dissolution is to be
56. But see Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Func-
tionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REv. 395 (1989).
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used, it should not refer to all departures from the partnership,
but only to those events that trigger a winding up of the
partnership business.
My greatest disappointment is that the word dissolution was
put in RUPA's breakup rules at our most recent meeting. The
term dissolution is an unnecessary one that was not included in
RUPA until the new breakup rules were close to final form. It
was reinstated primarily to protect limited partnerships,
particularly those with sole corporate general partners. For two
reasons, I believe the continued use of the term dissolution is
likely to generate confusion: (1) it always has; and (2) RUPA
now defines dissolution in a very different way than it has been
defined for over seventy-five years.
Over the last fifteen years, I have watched the tax law of
partnerships perverted to accommodate limited partnership tax
shelters. The basic rules on partnership allocations, for example,
are now far beyond the comprehension of the small business
people of America, the very people who must deal with them. 57
It saddens me that the state law of general partnerships may
now be unnecessarily complicated in an attempt to protect the
turf of limited partnerships. In light of longer depreciation
schedules58 and slower depreciation methods, 9 the at-risk rules, °
and the passive loss rules, 6' I am somewhat surprised that so
many think the turf is still so valuable. In light of the success
private limited partnerships have had in being classified as tax
partnerships, I am amazed by the fear that the turf might be
lost if one confusing word were to be deleted from the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act.
57. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1989), which begins with a table of contents
with over 80 entries.
58. See I.R.C. § 168(c) (1988).
59. See id. § 168(b)(3).
60. Id. § 465.
61. Id. § 469 (West Supp. 1990).
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